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Abstract
This paper analyses the ethics of routine measurement for healthcare improvement. 
Routine measurement is an increasingly central part of healthcare system design and 
is taken to be necessary for successful healthcare improvement efforts. It is widely 
recognised that the effectiveness of routine measurement in bringing about improve-
ment is limited—it often produces only modest effects or fails to generate antici-
pated improvements at all. We seek to show that these concerns do not exhaust the 
ethics of routine measurement. Even if routine measurement does lead to healthcare 
improvements, it has associated ethical costs which are not necessarily justified by 
its benefits. We argue that the practice of routine measurement changes the function 
of the healthcare system, resulting in an unintended and ethically significant trans-
formation of the sector. It is difficult to determine whether such changes are justified 
or offset by the benefits of routine measurement because there may be no shared 
understanding of what is ‘good’ in healthcare by which to compare the benefits of 
routine measurement with the goods that are precluded by it. We counsel that the 
practice of routine measurement should proceed with caution and should be recog-
nised to be an ethically significant choice, rather than an inevitability.
Keywords Ethics · Healthcare improvement · Measurement · Continuous 
improvement · Patient experience
Introduction
Measurement is central to healthcare improvement. The 2008 National Health Ser-
vice (NHS) report High Quality Care For All explicitly states what is often tac-
itly assumed: “we can only be sure to improve what we can actually measure” [1]. 
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Assessing quality through measurement is increasingly taken to involve not just peri-
odic audits or inspections, but routine measurement. The holy grail of such routine 
measurement practices is ‘continuous improvement.’ Though continuous improve-
ment has been promoted for three decades [2], the widespread uptake of digital tools 
has transformed it from a distant ambition into something that looks increasingly 
like a practical possibility.
This paper takes stock of the ethics of building routine measurement for improve-
ment into healthcare systems. We begin, in Sect. 2, by outlining the value of meas-
urement and quantification in healthcare improvement. Thereafter, our argument is 
in two parts. First, in Sect. 3, we raise some relatively familiar questions about the 
instrumental effectiveness of measurement in bringing about improvements, sug-
gesting that all-too-frequently it does not live up to its promise. Then, in Sect.  4, 
we argue that even if routine measurement for improvement does reliably lead to 
improvements, the practice has associated ethical costs. We argue that the practice 
of routine measurement has morally significant, transformative effects on the health-
care system and on professional practice. We identify and explore three such trans-
formations: (a) changes to the definition of a ‘good’ healthcare system; (b) changes 
to the definition of ‘good’ healthcare; and (c) changes to the nature of accountability 
for healthcare decision-making. Making measurement and improvement into cen-
tral functions of the healthcare system, we argue, creates conditions where certain 
activities, objects and aims can be easily seen to be valuable, and where the value of 
other activities, objects and aims can be obscured.
In Sect. 5, we conclude. The rise of routine measurement is unlikely to be revers-
ible. We do not seek to suggest that it should be reversed—and certainly not in a 
blanket sense. Nor do we suggest that measurement or routine measurement are in 
themselves problematic or unethical. Nonetheless, routine measurement should pro-
ceed with the understanding that, as a practice, it has costs that are not straightfor-
wardly justified or outweighed by the benefits that it brings. Throughout, we illus-
trate our discussion using examples from the measurement of patient experience, 
though the conclusions that we draw should not be taken to be limited to these cases 
alone.
Measurement and Improvement
Measurement and healthcare improvement are such close bedfellows that the lat-
ter is commonly thought impossible without the former. The Institute for Health-
care Improvement (IHI), for instance, identifies “[a] clear, measurable aim” and “[a] 
measurement framework in support of reaching the aim” as necessary components 
of all improvement efforts [3]. The NHS Patient Safety First Campaign plainly 
states: “To demonstrate if changes are really improvement, you need the ability to 
test changes and measure the impact successfully” [4]. An NHS guide to improv-
ing healthcare services, which uses the IHI ‘Model For Improvement,’ asks aspir-
ing improvers “How will we know if a change is an improvement?” and answers: 
“Measure the baseline,” “Measure regularly during testing,” “Continue to measure 
after the improvement is implemented” [5]. Measure, measure, measure.
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So measurement has ‘epistemic value,’ that is, it can give us knowledge about 
healthcare processes and outcomes. And this knowledge can be used to justify claims 
about how good or bad healthcare is. Without measurement improvement efforts are 
based on guesses, intuitions and judgements, rather than knowledge. But epistemic 
value is not enough to secure the link between measurement and improvement. For 
that, measurement must also have ‘teleologic value,’ that is, it must serve the pur-
pose for which it is intended. In this case, it must serve the ultimate end of improve-
ment. In order to have such teleologic value, measurement must ground changes to 
health services that make the services better in some respect. Both the epistemic and 
teleologic value of measurement are forms of instrumental value—they character-
ise measurement as valuable insofar as it generates or leads to some other valuable 
ends.1 In this section, we set out how measurement realises these values.
Measuring aspects of inputs, processes and outcomes enables us to judge the 
effectiveness of interventions, and sometimes to infer causal relationships between 
different elements of a system [7]. It does so by providing a systematic represen-
tation of the features of processes and objects that are relevant to their perform-
ing defined functions or fulfilling their ends. Measurement can be used to create 
something approximating a ‘whole picture’ representation, allowing recognition of 
problems that are difficult to identify via the partial knowledge of processes that 
is available from any one vantage point. Measurement for improvement takes both 
quantitative and qualitative forms. Quantitative measurement uses numbers to repre-
sent characteristics of healthcare systems, such as mortality rates, disease incidence, 
bed days, and waiting times. Qualitative measurement uses chiefly textual data, from 
written documents, interviews, and surveys, for example, to develop a systematic 
representation of more nebulous characteristics such as organisational strategy, 
safety culture and patient-centredness. Measurement, and particularly quantifica-
tion, can provide a common language for describing outcomes and outputs with 
some precision. It enables comparisons to be made across time, and across different 
teams and organisations. These characteristics underpin the central place of meas-
urement in accountability and performance management systems. They can signal 
openness and transparency, as well as supporting audit and providing justification 
for decision-making.
The place of measurement in healthcare is often cemented by financial incen-
tives such as pay-for-performance schemes and value-based pricing, as well as 
contractually and legally mandated publication of data and participation in clini-
cal audits. These financial and institutional decision-making tools require wide-
spread measurement in order to evidence their evaluation of healthcare services. 
The development of such mechanisms over the past several decades has been 
1 In this paper we invoke the concepts of instrumental value and non-instrumental value. Instrumental 
value is the value something has in virtue of being a means to an end. Non-instrumental value (or final 
value) is the value something has as an end in itself. We broadly follow Christine Korsgaard in taking 
this distinction to be orthogonal to the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value, that is, between 
the value that something has ‘in itself’ or ‘for its own sake,’ and the value that something has in virtue of 
its relationship to other things [6]. We are not directly concerned with intrinsic and extrinsic value here, 
and our discussion instead focuses on instrumental and non-instrumental value.
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underpinned by a shift to an improvement mindset, whereby health systems and 
services are assessed and valued on the basis of their measured outcomes [8]. 
While there are other factors at play which motivate and shape measurement-
based financial and institutional structures—notably relating to the relationship 
between healthcare institutions and government, insurers and pharmaceutical 
companies—they are explained and justified with reference to cost efficiency, 
waste reduction, and clinical effectiveness [9].
Routine measurement, that is, measurement as a part of day-to-day practice, 
is increasingly taken to be necessary for meaningful improvement. Measurement 
for improvement can take the form of regular audit or inspection checks to ensure 
continued compliance with good practice standards, but such checks are typically 
cyclical, rather than continuous. The move towards more regular, routine or even 
continuous measurement marks a move away from seeking to improve services by 
rooting out poor performance, and towards ‘continuous improvement.’ Continu-
ous improvement, a concept that comes out of Japanese industry, sees poor per-
formance as typically being built into systems and processes, rather than owing 
to the intentional behaviour of particular individuals. It involves identifying inef-
ficient and wasteful aspects of processes and implementing interventions in an 
attempt to streamline systems. Don Berwick describes the underpinning theory:
Real improvement in quality depends, according to the Theory of Continu-
ous Improvement, on understanding and revising the production processes 
on the basis of data about the processes themselves. "Every process pro-
duces information on the basis of which the process can be improved," say 
these theorists [2].
Routine measurement is thus central to continuous improvement, because 
it is needed to capture the information that is produced by the system. Routine 
measurement and continuous improvement are increasingly stated as core aims 
of healthcare systems. The Department of Health and Human Services in the 
United States (US), for example, defines healthcare quality improvement as “sys-
tematic and continuous actions that lead to measurable improvement in health 
care services” [10]. The NHS Constitution includes a commitment to continuous 
improvement:
You have the right to expect NHS bodies to monitor, and make efforts to 
improve continuously, the quality of healthcare they commission or provide. 
This includes improvements to the safety, effectiveness and experience of 
services [11].
Routine, widespread measurement and the continuous improvement framework 
are also advocated because of their potential to overcome some recognised prob-
lems with using measurement for performance management. ‘Name and shame’ 
approaches to healthcare improvement can lead people to falsify or massage data 
to improve perceived performance, and to spend needless time and resources 
attempting to disprove incompetence [12]. Such effects are particularly liable 
to arise when measurement is used as the basis for financial and status-related 
43
1 3
Health Care Analysis (2021) 29:39–58 
incentives such as pay-for-performance and value-based commissioning schemes. 
While cyclical measurement focusses on pre-specified targets, routine measure-
ment also uses data to find and explore patterns that can inform quality improve-
ment. Continuous improvement explicitly eschews a blame culture in favour of 
a collaborative approach to understanding why a system produces the outcomes 
that it does, and what changes can be made to improve upon them, thus disincen-
tivising gaming and the manipulation of data [2].
So measurement and routine measurement have the potential to generate 
knowledge about healthcare processes and systems, and to underpin improvement 
efforts—that is, to produce objects of substantial value. However, in practice meas-
urement does not always succeed in generating this value. Moreover, despite its ben-
efits, routine measurement for improvement has side effects of its own, which sug-
gest limits to its value.
The Instrumental Limitations of Measurement for Improvement
While measurement can, in theory, lead to improvement in healthcare services, 
in reality it regularly fails to have such teleologic value, or leads only to modest 
improvements [13]. Patient experience provides a good example of the instrumen-
tal limitations of measurement for improvement because there is widespread fail-
ure to transform the measurement of patient experience into improvements in future 
patient experience. While we focus on examples from the measurement of patient 
experience in this section, the findings that we discuss support wide-ranging evi-
dence of similar instrumental limitations in healthcare improvement efforts more 
generally [14–25].
Patient experience measures typically seek to capture how patients feel about the 
aspects of their care that are tangible to them: the convenience of the services pro-
vided, the environment within which care takes place, the ways healthcare profes-
sionals interact with them. Collecting such data and using it as part of an assess-
ment of healthcare quality represents a recognition that the patient perspective is 
necessary for understanding the quality of healthcare services; knowledge of clini-
cal outcomes, financial balance sheets and best practice guidelines are not enough. 
Measuring patient experience and sharing data analysis is presented as instrumental 
to improving patient experiences of healthcare in the future [1, 26].
The measurement of patient experience is increasingly routine and widespread 
[27]. In the US, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services use several different 
patient experience surveys nationwide to assess service quality, and sometimes to 
determine the payments made to providers [28]. The NHS runs a series of patient 
experience surveys, covering inpatient care, emergency medicine, general practice, 
mental health, and social care [29–32]. Multiple measures can be, and are, used 
alongside one another, to build up a rich picture of patient expectations, experience 
and satisfaction with healthcare services [33]. Qualitative measures that are more 
narrative, in-depth and personal can complement the generalisable, numerical out-
puts of widely administrated surveys. However, the more in-depth, service-specific 
surveys are far more time and resource intensive to administer and evaluate than 
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generic surveys with numerical outputs, so they inevitably include fewer patients 
[34]. If the measurement of patient experience is to be routine both in terms of reg-
ularity and spread, then realistically it must largely take the form of standardised 
surveys.
Baldie et al. argue that there are four key assumptions behind the idea that meas-
uring patient experience can help improve patient experience [35]2:
1. Practitioners believe there are valid ways of assessing the healthcare experiences 
of patients for use in feedback.
2. Feedback of information about patients’ experiences to service providers stimu-
lates improvement efforts.
3. Improvement efforts lead to observable changes in practice aimed at enhancing 
patients’ experiences.
4. Observable changes in practice in response to patient feedback lead to improve-
ments in future patients’ experiences of healthcare.
The failure of any one of these assumptions can limit the value of measuring 
patient experience. Various studies have shown that clinicians can find measures 
of patient experience to be valuable and instrumental to improvement, at least in 
principle [36–41]. One study reported that “[d]octors who rejected the idea of feed-
back were regarded as depressed, alcoholic, burned-out, or just ‘bad doctors’” [39]. 
However, the validity and reliability of certain measures of patient experience are 
also called into question by clinicians [36, 39–41]. Concerns are raised about repre-
sentativeness, the relevance of survey questions to patients, survey methodology and 
design. Of course, such concerns may be appropriate—some measures of patient 
experience will be invalid. But staff were more likely to question the measures and 
data when these were critical of services than when they were complimentary [34, 
36, 42], which suggests that concerns are based, at least in part, on something other 
than the validity of measures.
Measurement of patients’ experiences can also fail to stimulate improvement 
efforts. For example, doctors and healthcare managers tend to only base improve-
ment endeavours on patient experiences when measures identify problems with the 
service that they have already noticed themselves [38]. Improvement efforts are 
likely to focus on areas that are easier to change—such as food, the built environ-
ment or booking systems—rather than more intractable areas—such as communi-
cation and information provision [43]. Sometimes improvement efforts are broadly 
prompted by attempts to measure patient experience but end up focussing on areas 
not actually covered in the data that has been collected [37]. This looks to weaken 
the extent to which measuring patient experience for improvement can be said to 
reflect a patient-centred approach. More generally it should be clear that even where 
measures have unquestioned epistemic value they do not inherently have the desired 
teleologic value. For measures to drive improvements in the specific domains that 
2 Baldie et al. focus on general practice, but their programme theory applies to measures of patient expe-
rience and improvement efforts more generally.
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are being measured key sets of actors have to be both motivated to respond to them 
(including by designing suitably responsive systems) and effective in so doing.
When improvement efforts are implemented, the likelihood of them leading to 
observable changes in practice is slim, and the chance of them actually leading to 
improvements in future patients’ experiences of healthcare is even slimmer. Many 
studies of the impact of patient experience measures focus only on their perceived 
impact and value by doctors and other healthcare professionals, and it’s unclear 
how much this reveals about genuine impact for patients [44]. Those studies that 
do measure actual impact on patient reported experience report very limited and 
mixed improvement outcomes [35, 44]. One improvement collaborative, for exam-
ple, provided large amounts of support for healthcare providers to run improve-
ment projects, in the form of planning meetings, written guides, data analysis and 
views, discussion of strategies and presentation of results [45]. However, only half 
of the providers surveyed actually implemented an improvement intervention, and 
none reported statistically significant improvements as the result of their efforts. The 
improvements that were observed were with respect to modest interventions which 
involved no major change in clinician behaviour.
Sometimes measuring patient experience does lead to improvements in future 
patient-reported experience. But here too there are caveats. While measuring experi-
ence can help to improve very poorly rated services, it may be much less effective at 
improving services that are already average or good [41, 46]. Moreover, a ‘first-time 
effect’ of measuring patient experience can be seen in poorly performing hospitals, 
with improvements diminishing in subsequent rounds of measurement and reporting 
[41]. This suggests de facto limits to continuous improvement. Patient feedback is 
judged by staff to be more useful if measurement outcomes are detailed and spe-
cific to their organisation, for example feedback from surveys containing free-text or 
from in depth interviews, and less helpful if it is generic [27, 41]. This indicates that 
the more generic surveys, which allow for wide comparison and less-resource inten-
sive data collection and evaluation, may be less effective with respect to healthcare 
improvement.
So what is the upshot of these limitations? Each of the four key assumptions iden-
tified by Baldie et al. can, and at least sometimes does, fail to hold. This may indicate 
that much of the measurement of patient experience is unjustified. Asking patients 
to give feedback which is then ignored may be unethical [27], but so too is asking 
patients to give feedback in the knowledge that—even when it is not ignored—will 
not be epistemically or teleologically valuable in the ways that are invoked to justify 
its collection. Furthermore, the limitations of the measurement of patient experience 
for healthcare improvement are not just the result of poor data quality or insufficient 
data collection. They are also a result of the way in which data are used. Improving 
the validity of patient experience measures and increasing the amount of informa-
tion that is collected may help to solve some of the limitations identified here, but 
certainly not all of them.
Evidence of similar instrumental limitations in other areas of healthcare improve-
ment, besides patient experience, suggests that the measurement of healthcare ser-
vices does not consistently serve healthcare improvement purposes in the ways 
that it is assumed and claimed to do. More, and more accurate, measurement will 
46 Health Care Analysis (2021) 29:39–58
1 3
not necessarily rectify this or otherwise increase its value, because the failures to 
transform measurements into improvements are not only a matter of the quality and 
quantity of data, but a matter of how these data are understood and used.
Our discussion up to this point has been limited to the instrumental value and 
effects of the measurement. We have considered the goods that are intended to be 
produced by routine measurement, and the obstacles to it generating those goods. 
The second part of our argument considers the non-instrumental effects of routine 
measurement, including the goods that are embodied in practices of routine meas-
urement, and the ways in which these can reconstitute healthcare.
The Ethical Costs of Routine Measurement
Suppose that there are valid ways of routinely measuring patient experience, clinical 
effectiveness, safety, and so on, which reliably lead to observable changes in prac-
tice and, moreover, that these changes generate improvements that can be observed 
in future measures. Routine measurement for improvement would, in such circum-
stances, not only be possible, but would also have the desired teleologic value. But 
at what cost would this have been attained and would that attainment be worth the 
cost? In the remainder of the paper we consider the ethical costs of routine measure-
ment for improvement.3
While routine measurement may have teleologic value when it succeeds in pro-
ducing the desired causal consequences of routine measurement for improvement, 
it nonetheless has substantial transformative ‘side-effects.’ The practice of routine 
measurement reconstitutes and reframes healthcare in ways that result in an unin-
tended transformation of the sector. The transformative costs of measurement are 
distinct from its instrumental costs and benefits, and not straightforwardly com-
mensurable with them. For, as we will argue, the practice of routine measurement 
changes the way that value is understood in healthcare. That is, it creates condi-
tions where certain activities, objects and aims can be easily seen to be valuable, 
and where the value of other activities, objects and aims can be obscured. We char-
acterise the transformative costs of measurement as non-instrumental effects. They 
are not straightforwardly effects which enable or impede the attainment of particu-
lar valuable ends; rather, they enable and impede particular ways of valuing, and 
3 There are, of course, financial costs to routine measurement, including routine measurement of patient 
experience [47]. It is, in theory, possible to calculate the financial cost of routine measurement and this 
figure could be included in an evaluation of the impact of such data collection with respect to health-
care improvement, though, in practice, such calculations are rarely made. Financial cost can be treated as 
roughly commensurable with the instrumental value of targeted improvements; improvements in patient 
experience, clinical effectiveness or timeliness, for example, can be said to be worth the additional finan-
cial cost of measurement and improvement initiatives (or not). Such trade-offs are complex and contro-
versial, but they involve ethical reasoning of a sort that is well established in healthcare decision-making. 
The ethical costs of routine measurement that we identify in this section are different in an important way 
from the kinds of cost that can be included in such trade-offs. In what follows we focus on some of the 
non-instrumental costs of routine measurement, which have been relatively neglected in critiques and 
discussion of measurement in healthcare.
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particular ways of understanding what is of value and what is not. When we call 
these effects ‘costs’ we don’t necessarily mean something wholly negative like 
‘downside’ or ‘disadvantage’. Rather, we intend to capture something about what 
might be lost when healthcare is measured in a routine and widespread way. Some-
times such losses may be justifiable, but sometimes they will be unjustifiably bur-
densome. Sometimes they may be reversible—it may be possible to regain the pre-
cluded goods and values by simply ceasing to practice routine measurement—but at 
other times this might be difficult, for example, if the practice engenders deep-seated 
changes in social and ethical norms, expectations and behaviours.
The transformative effects of routine measurement come about chiefly because 
routine measurement changes the function of the healthcare system. Implement-
ing routine measurement for improvement makes measurement and improvement 
into central functions of the healthcare system, alongside, for example, the delivery 
of clinical and therapeutic care. Measurement is sometimes taken to be a wholly 
descriptive practice—a matter of looking at an object or practice and empirically 
estimating the magnitude of its properties and relations. The object of measurement 
exists, and has properties and relations with given magnitude and nature, separately 
from its measurement. In a healthcare improvement context, however, it is difficult 
to maintain such an understanding of measurement. While measurement is some-
times carried out by third parties that are external to the practice of healthcare, more 
often it is embedded in healthcare institutions and practices. Even when measure-
ment for healthcare improvement takes the form of audit and inspection, third parties 
typically use data that have been collected within healthcare institutions, by health-
care practitioners. Sometimes the parts of institutions that perform this function are 
compartmentalised—a hospital may have an audit department, improvement offic-
ers, a director of quality. However, more often, and particularly in the case of routine 
measurement, measurement is built into the day-to-day work of all employees. So, in 
order to routinely measure its practices, the roles of healthcare professionals and the 
activities that healthcare comprises undergo fairly significant changes. The object of 
measurement—the healthcare system and its processes—becomes something which 
also, simultaneously, performs a measurement function.
Moreover, routine measurement for improvement does not just add measurement 
and improvement to a list of existing functions of healthcare, rather, it reframes the 
existing functions of healthcare. If the processes and outcomes of healthcare must be 
measured, in order to be improved, then those processes and outcomes themselves 
need to be understandable—and understood—in metrical terms. Patient safety pro-
vides a good example of this. It is widely taken to be a central function of health-
care that it avoids causing unintended or unexpected harm to patients. Succeed-
ing in this means not just avoiding actual harm, but also avoiding putting patients 
at high risk of harm—healthcare which involves a lot of ‘near misses’ is not safe 
healthcare. Once routine measurement is added to the functions of healthcare, the 
nature of patient safety changes. For now the epistemic standards attached to harm 
and risk of harm—that is, the standards for determining when and how it is known 
that patients are being harmed and being put at risk—are determined by measure-
ment practices. Patient safety also changes when improvement is seen as a function 
of healthcare. Recent developments in the field of patient safety have moved away 
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from an emphasis on avoiding making mistakes, where safety is understood as the 
absence of accidents and incidents [48]. Instead, safety is increasingly seen in terms 
of optimising system performance to ensure that things go right as often as possi-
ble—a much more aspirational model, which focuses on incremental improvement 
and harm reduction, rather than the avoidance of specified harmful events.
In his work on audit, Powers argues that audit does not just passively measure 
what is going on in organisations, but actively constructs them in its image [49]. 
That is, it encourages, and even requires, institutions to be auditable. We are suggest-
ing that continuous measurement for improvement has the potential to do something 
similar. The prioritisation of routine measurement and improvement activities ena-
bles and encourages this redescription and redirection of core healthcare concepts 
and activities. And in this way, measurement and improvement become a central 
part of what it means to deliver healthcare, not something that is done in addition to 
delivering healthcare. We identify three changes effected by changing the function 
of the healthcare system in this way: first, routine measurement changes the defini-
tion of a ‘good’ healthcare system. Secondly, it changes definition of ‘good’ health-
care. Finally, it changes the nature of accountability for healthcare decision-making.
Routine Measurement and the ‘Good’ Healthcare System
The first transformative effect of routine measurement for improvement is that the 
existence of the practice changes what it is to be a ‘good’ healthcare system.
The function of a complex social object such as a healthcare system is norma-
tively inflected. That is, in expressing the function of the system we don’t merely 
describe what the system does, but also say something about what it ought to do. 
This is because such objects don’t just happen to exist, in comparison, perhaps, to 
geological objects or, more controversially, biological objects. Rather they are inten-
tionally brought into existence, and designed and structured in order to bring about 
given ends and to fulfil particular purposes.4 The upshot of this is that expressing the 
function of such a system expresses something about what it would mean for that 
system to do well or badly with respect to those ends and purposes. When measure-
ment and improvement become central parts of the function of a healthcare system, 
then, there is a change to what it means for it to be a ‘good’ healthcare system. That 
is, it is good not only insofar as it delivers healthcare, but also insofar as it measures 
and improves upon the delivery of healthcare.
This change in the meaning of what it is to be a ‘good’ healthcare system has 
notable ethical costs, which are most clearly seen when the aim of routine meas-
urement is continuous improvement. When a framework of measurement for con-
tinuous improvement is introduced, the reframing of the function of the measure-
ment system in terms of measurement and improvement is radical, because it tends 
to make healthcare functions into maximising functions. The goal of continuous 
4 The same appears to be true of less complex objects that are the result of intentional design—we don’t 
want to say that the function of a kitchen knife is to injure people, even if that in fact describes how, on 
occasion, it is used.
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improvement provides a perpetual reason to think that the healthcare system is 
not ‘good enough,’ and that there is always more that could, and should, be done. 
The function of the healthcare system therefore becomes not just to produce some 
defined set of goods, but to maximise those goods.
As a moral maximising function, continuous improvement rules out other kinds 
of moral reasoning as justification for healthcare system design and decision-mak-
ing. One example of this is ‘satisficing’ or ‘sufficiency’ functions, which see the 
provision of ‘good enough’ healthcare to everyone as more morally significant 
than maximising health benefits. In theory, the continuous improvement frame-
work treats every equally weighted improvement as having equal moral status. For 
example, there is no reason for thinking that improvements which bring one ser-
vice up from poorly performing to average are any more significant than those 
which move another service from being good to excellent. Moreover, a commitment 
to continuous improvement need not involve a  concern with equal distribution of 
healthcare services across a population. Conversely, if good healthcare is thought 
to be best justified by a satisficing principle, there will come a point, somewhere 
above a threshold level designating a basic minimum, where delivering further 
improvements becomes morally negligible. So, for example, once patients report 
good experiences of care, it might not be a moral priority to continue to routinely 
measure patient feedback and strive for marginal gains, especially where there are 
problems or holes elsewhere in the system. On a satisficing account, measurement 
and improvement should be prioritised in some areas over others, not because such 
a strategy is likely to lead to the greatest possible improvements, but because it is 
likely to lead to improvements which help to provide at least ‘good enough’ univer-
sal health coverage.
Adding a satisficing function to continuous improvement would thus undermine 
the ‘continuous’ nature of improvement`. Satisficing and continuous improvement 
are incompatible frameworks for thinking about good healthcare provision. This 
indicates one cost of continuous improvement, at least when that idea is unqualified 
or unspecified—certain principles guiding healthcare system design, resource distri-
bution and justification of decision-making are ruled out insofar as they are incom-
patible with a maximising approach. More broadly, the case of continuous improve-
ment illustrates the tendency for improvement not only to become an extra health 
service function but to significantly reshape and reconstitute health system functions 
by embodying assumptions about what matters in core healthcare architectures.
Routine Measurement and ‘Good’ Healthcare
In addition to changing what it means for a healthcare system to be good, routine 
measurement for improvement also changes what it means for healthcare to be good. 
This is the second transformative effect of routine measurement for improvement.
The aim of improvement is, on its own, an insufficient guide to what is mor-
ally significant. Improvements will, plausibly, be judged on their extent—a larger 
improvement is, all things considered, better than a smaller one. But improvements 
may also be judged on their type: decreasing the number of avoidable deaths or the 
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infection rate may, for instance, be deemed more morally significant than improving 
patient reported experience of the built environment in healthcare institutions. How-
ever, there is nothing inherent in the aim of improvement which settles the relative 
significance of different types of improvement. So while building measurement for 
improvement into the function of a healthcare system determines something about 
what it would mean for it to be a ‘good’ healthcare system—that it should seek to 
improve its processes and outcomes via measurement—it does not specify the con-
tent of such improvement—what we should measure and which measurement out-
comes should be treated as better and worse. Substantive content must be provided 
by further specification of goals, the comparative value of different goods and ends, 
and constraints on actions and decisions.
Despite lacking such substantive normative content, measurement for improve-
ment does limit the meaning of ‘good’ healthcare to some extent. Namely, when 
measurement and improvement are part of the central function of a healthcare sys-
tem, good healthcare is understood in terms of measurable and measured processes 
and outcomes. The quality of care, and improvements to it, is assessed by collecting 
and evaluating measurements of it. What is measured matters—at least with respect 
to improvement and delivering good healthcare—more than what is not, because 
it determines what can be counted as an improvement and what cannot [50]. But 
not everything can be measured. In part this is a matter of resource constraint—
there are an indefinite number of potential metrics, and it is not possible to cap-
ture all of them. Moreover, some things are more difficult to measure than others, 
either because there are not clearly agreed conventions around their measurement, 
or because measurement is particularly resource intensive—for example, it may be 
very time-consuming or the measuring tools very expensive. But there also seem 
to be some entities for which measurement can only capture a relatively small part 
of their extent or value [51]. A broad normative concept like ‘patient experience’ 
is perhaps this kind of entity. We can identify many plausible, even valid measures 
of patient experience, but they will not add together to exhaustively define patient 
experience. This is because patient experience is complex, multifaceted and multi-
ply-realisable: there are many possible ways of defining and understanding patient 
experience, and particular measures of patient experience don’t straightforwardly 
reveal something definitive about how patients feel about their care. Instead each 
one constitutes a different measurable construct of ‘patient experience,’ the employ-
ment of which reveals something about that construct [52]. Each measure might be 
fit for purpose in some contexts, but will not reveal all that there is to know about 
patient experience.
There are a number of concerns with judging performance and making decisions 
on the basis of measurable attributes alone. There is reason to worry that orienting 
healthcare practitioners’ work towards measurement by defining improvement in 
terms of what is measured helps to equate this partial picture with good practice per 
se. A system that defines good healthcare practice in terms of particular measured 
processes or outcomes cannot distinguish between practice that is in fact good, and 
practice that merely meets the required performance targets [51]. There are well-
documented problems of data fabrication, manipulation and ‘gaming’ in relation to 
performance management [53, 54]. But, in addition, meeting performance targets can 
51
1 3
Health Care Analysis (2021) 29:39–58 
belie a number of less fraudulent but nonetheless problematic scenarios, for example, 
“hitting the target and missing the point” [51], where measurable targets are met, but 
practice is not in line with the goals or normative concepts which prompted the meas-
ure to be developed in the first place. A target culture may discourage and erode the 
use of good clinical judgement (informed by caring and respectful discussion with 
the patient) about the inappropriateness of particular processes or outcome goals in 
particular cases. And performance can easily remain or become poor in areas where 
it is not measured or not measurable, representing a lack of managerial control in 
some parts of the organisation under the veneer of total control via measurement 
[52]. These problems emerge in part because measurement captures only a partial 
picture of good practice, especially where complex normative concepts are involved.
So, for example, if good patient experience is a necessary part of good health-
care, then good healthcare will be healthcare which patients experience as good. 
But this does not mean that improving patients’ experience of healthcare necessarily 
improves healthcare: the fact that healthcare is experienced as good does not mean 
that it is good healthcare.5 There are ways of improving patients’ experiences of 
healthcare which do not in fact reflect good healthcare. If the measures of patient 
experience are taken to be the only means of assessing patient experience of health-
care, then improving patient experience healthcare will involve improvement along 
these measured attributes. But focussing on improving measures of patient experi-
ence may focus on the wrong thing, if not all healthcare that is experienced as good 
according to measures is in fact good in all important respects. In general, if meas-
ures are indicators or signs of good practice rather than identical with good practice, 
then improving the indicators need not entail improved practice.
Measurement for improvement, then, changes what it means for healthcare to be 
good by reconceptualising ‘good’ in metrical terms. This can preclude objects and 
ends that are less easily measured from being recognised as valuable, and systemati-
cally prioritise measured goods.
Routine Measurement and Accountability
The third transformative effect of routine measurement is that it changes the nature 
of accountability for healthcare decision-making.
Measurement is often seen as necessary for accountability [55–57]. To be 
accountable is to be responsible for something and, moreover, to be expected to 
5 Our argument here identifies an example of the logical fallacy ‘affirming the consequent.’ Compare the 
following two (invalid) syllogisms:
1. If this is good healthcare, then this will be experienced as good healthcare.
  This is experienced as good healthcare.
  Therefore, this is good healthcare.
2. If this is a cat, then this is a mammal.
  This is a mammal.
  Therefore, this is a cat.
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provide a reason or justification for it—explaining why it is valuable or necessary, 
for instance. Measurement is taken to play an important role in explaining and justi-
fying actions. Measuring aspects of inputs, processes and outcomes can provide evi-
dence of the value of actions and interventions, as well as the value of organisations. 
Measurement can help third parties to understand the grounds for particular deci-
sions. It is down to the features of measurement discussed above in Sect. 2, such as 
its systematicity and comparability, that measurement plays this role in accountabil-
ity. Measurements, in theory, provide evidence that is less partial than the opinions 
and judgements of individuals, and which can be compared across different institu-
tions, individuals and across time.
This move towards a measurement-centred conception of accountability changes 
aspects of relationships in healthcare. Concerns in this area are sometimes summa-
rised as about a deterioration of trust between the public and healthcare institutions. 
Whilst we do not accept all the framings of such concerns about trust, we do think 
certain uses of routine measurement have the potential to corrode relationships and 
trust. Grounding accountability in measurement might be thought to lead to a deteri-
oration in trust between the public and healthcare institutions, or between particular 
patients and healthcare staff. In a classic essay, Tsoukas argues that: “the more infor-
mation on the inner workings of an expert system observers seek to have, the less 
they will be inclined to trust its practitioners; the less practitioners are trusted, the 
less likely it is for the benefits of specialized expertise to be realized” [58]. In other 
words, accountability that is grounded in measurement seems to be based on mis-
trust—measurable evidence of actions and their consequences are deemed accept-
able justification, whereas personal judgements and assurances from hospital staff, 
are not. If patients are encouraged to carefully examine the performance of their 
doctors and nurses before agreeing to consultation or treatment, this suggests a lack 
of trust, both in the individuals involved, but also in the education and training sys-
tem of which they are a product. However, there are limits to the extent to which 
measurement should be thought to undermine trust. Trust, on the whole, is subject 
to evidence. To trust a person or institution without any evidence for their trustwor-
thiness, or to trust them despite evidence that they are not trustworthy, is likely a 
foolhardy strategy. And certain forms of checking and monitoring are compatible 
with, and even necessary for, trust [59, 60]. Perhaps the evidence provided by rou-
tine measurement for performance management and improvement is just the kind 
of evidence that is necessary for patients to trust clinical staff and institutions. If so, 
the fact that routine measurement is used as evidence for assessments of account-
ability need not in itself suggest a deterioration in trust. On the other hand, continu-
ous checking and accounting may be incompatible with trust, which does seem to 
require granting some discretion to the person who is trusted [61]. So there may be 
certain uses of routine measurement for improvement which do lead to or represent 
a deterioration in trust.
Regardless, treating measurement as necessary for accountability does shape the 
way in which healthcare can be valued. As discussed above, measurement generates 
a partial picture of practice. It picks out certain things as markers of good and bad 
care, and—by omission— treats other things as less relevant. Taking measurement 
to be necessary for accountability, and a primary means of assuring accountability, 
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fixes those things that are markers of good and bad care—that is, the things that are 
measured—and the kind of reasoning and justification that can be accepted as part 
of assurance and assessment of accountability—justification that refers to changes in 
measurement outcomes. Those processes and outcomes that are less easily measured 
will be less likely to be judged to be valuable. This is likely to impact some health-
care sectors and practices more than others, particularly those with more ‘soft’ and 
‘indirect’ outcomes, such as social care, mental health and public health.6
The measurement of patient experience again provides a good example of the 
way in which the role of measurement in accountability shapes what can be counted 
as good healthcare. The questions in surveys of patient experience send clear sig-
nals about what the survey designers and distributors think patients should expect 
to receive from healthcare staff. Patients are questioned about particular attributes 
of their healthcare experiences regardless of how important these are to them. The 
best measures will be validated to ensure that they in fact measure what they purport 
to measure. But, as noted above, this cannot ensure that they capture all things that 
impact on patient experience. Assessment of care as good, with respect to patient 
experience, depends on patients answering these questions positively, or giving high 
scores. So doctors perform well, with respect to patient experience, if they can be 
shown to successfully deliver on this set of measurable ends—spending a specified 
amount of time with each patient, for example, offering an appointment within a set 
time, or not leaving patients waiting a long time for treatment. Without evidence 
from patient experience measures, it can be difficult to prove that something matters 
to patients or contributes to good or poor experiences of clinical care, if measures 
are taken to be central to understanding how the system operates. So those char-
acteristics of care that are captured in patient experience surveys become the pub-
lic face of patient centredness and patient experience, and the characteristics on the 
basis of which an institution or individual can be praised or criticised.
Building measurement into accountability shapes and limits the kinds of justi-
fication that can be given for healthcare decisions and practices. This is liable to 
determine the kinds of practices that are deemed acceptable or successful, favouring 
practices that maximise particular kinds of health benefit for populations, and which 
are amenable to routine measurement, even when such practices may be inappropri-
ate or less good for some people. Such changes in the terms in which justification 
can be provided might also be taken to limit the scope for trust in the healthcare sys-
tem. While trust in healthcare providers could be more readily justified with respect 
to the standards of what’s measured—because appropriate evidence for trusting atti-
tudes can be provided in these areas—this is not the case with respect to non-meas-
urable aspects of healthcare.
6 Indeed, these are the areas where funding has been cut for health services in the UK over the past dec-
ade [62–65].
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Routine Measurement: is it Worth it?
We have argued that routine measurement for healthcare improvement changes 
the healthcare system in ethically significant ways. It changes the function of the 
system, and because of this it changes what it is to be a good healthcare sys-
tem, what it is to be good healthcare, and how providers and staff can be held to 
account for the quality of services. But do the professed benefits of routine meas-
urement and improvement make up for the things of value which they preclude?
Although this question is rarely posed so explicitly, in practice there seems to 
be a widespread presumption of a positive answer to it. However, it is a difficult 
question to answer because there is no single overarching framework available by 
which to compare a healthcare system transformed by routine measurement for 
improvement with one not so transformed. The conception of ‘good healthcare’ 
as constructed by routine measurement is inextricable from the value of meas-
urement and data collection. There may be no shared understanding of what is 
good in healthcare by which to compare the goods of routine measurement with 
the goods that are precluded by it. In this sense the losses engendered by a move 
to routine measurement might be ‘tragic’ in the sense elucidated by MacIntyre 
[66], that is, it is possible that they cannot be fully, or perhaps even partially, 
compensated for by the goods which seek to replace them. Furthermore, once a 
new measurement-constrained value framework becomes embedded and normal-
ised, it may become increasingly difficult even to recognise the good in displaced 
frameworks. Embedding routine measurement and continuous improvement in 
the healthcare system has the potential to change the ethical landscape of health-
care, by shaping and limiting what kind of activities, objects and ends are seen as 
valuable, and the ways that they can be valued.
Despite offering a sceptical discussion of routine measurement for improve-
ment, and more specifically some of the limitations of the idea of continuous 
improvement, we do recognise the value and social power of the ‘measure and 
improve’ approach to healthcare, particularly with respect to very poor practice. 
Furthermore, routine measurement, and the conception of improvement it pro-
duces, is unlikely to go away any time soon. However, the arguments we have 
rehearsed here indicate the need to reflect on how routine measurement is taken 
forward.
Overall we argue that the further spread of routine measurement needs to be 
accompanied by a degree of routine scepticism and that this may entail adjust-
ments both to the pace at which it is implemented, the kinds of areas where it is 
applied and the ways it is used. The practice of routine measurement for improve-
ment is a choice and not an inevitability. The notion of continuous improvement 
in particular is just one way of conceptualising the function, role and trajectory 
of a healthcare system. Furthermore, routine measurement for improvement is a 
normative choice; a choice that reflects and establishes a particular conception of 
the good—and in the case of continuous improvement specifically represents a 
maximising framework for thinking about the good in healthcare. Such a norma-
tive framework may be more appropriate for some parts of the healthcare system 
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than others, for example, there may sometimes be reason to prioritise other values 
over continuous improvement. It is a choice which precludes, but does not neces-
sarily offset, other values and conceptions of the good in healthcare. A continu-
ous improvement framework may not, for instance, be appropriate where there are 
areas of healthcare delivery that are clearly below a reasonable minimum—a sat-
isficing approach might make better sense of improvement priorities. Moreover, 
routine measurement should be understood as one source of information about 
how good or bad healthcare services are, but not exhaustive, nor able to supplant 
non-routine means of coming to understand healthcare processes, such as inspec-
tions, ethnographies and the experiences of healthcare practitioners. Publication 
of data about healthcare organisations, and rankings of organisations, should pro-
ceed with caution, and not with a ‘more is better’ attitude.
In the first part of our argument we suggested that, and showed how, the measure-
ment of patient experience fails to deliver on its promise. We do not wish to over-
generalise from this one cluster of examples, but these findings support evidence 
that routine measurement for improvement is often ineffective on its own terms in 
other areas of healthcare; that is, it may not transform healthcare in intended ways. 
In the second part of our argument we have added in more fundamental concerns 
about the very significant unintended transformations that may come about as a 
result of routine measurement for improvement. The potential transformations in 
healthcare’s functions, professional roles and forms of accountability are both prac-
tically and morally substantial. We recognise that dominant structures and expecta-
tions within healthcare systems mean that individual actors may often have com-
paratively little elbow room in this regard and, of course, that—even if, and after, 
the implications of scepticism about measurement are accepted—routine measure-
ment for improvement has a valuable contribution to make in many areas. Nonethe-
less, the use of routine measurement in healthcare does not represent an unequivocal 
good. We suggest that there are therefore good reasons for individual actors who 
are planning specific health services with improvement in mind to be cautious both 
about the emphasis they give to embedding routine measurement in their plans, and 
the ways in which they apply and interpret such measurement.
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